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Stilwell cautioned that the most likely Japanese response to any accomplishment by the
bombers would be a ground offensive to capture
the airfields. After the Japanese experienced minimize the Burma Road in March 1942, the only line of communications with China was
over "the Hump", as the air ferry route to China above the Himalayas was known as.
Until the Burma Road could be reopened by the ground forces, all the gasoline,
ammunition and materials utilised American forces in China experienced flown about the Hump.
From there, materials would be flown to China in Consolidated B-24
Liberator bombers converted to Consolidated C-87 Liberator
Express transport plane. It was believed that 200 C-87 flights would
be required to assistance each individual VLR bomber team, with
2,000 C-87s in operation by October 1944 and 4,000 by May 1945.
Five missions for every group for every thirty day period could be flown, with 168 group-months considered to be
sufficient to destroy all targets in Japan inside twelve months.
Support for the effort was by the port of Calcutta, which was approximated to be ready to manage the added 596,000 quick tons (541,000 t) per month.